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BGP	Convergence
•	Border	Gateway	Protocol	(BGP)	is	widely	
used	as	the	main	inter	Autonomous	System	
(AS)	Internet	routing	protocol.
•	An	AS	selects	its	preferred	routes	based	on	its	
routing	policy	and	the	best	routes	that	have	
been	advertised	by	its	neighboring	ASes.
•	Local	AS	policies	play	an	important	role	in	
preferred	route	selection	because	the	BGP										
allows	policy-based	decisions	to	override									
distance	metrics.
•	Local	routing	policies	are	usually	defined	based	
on	a	limited	knowledge	of	other	AS	policies	
and	network	topology	and,	hence,	may	be											
inconsistent.	
•	These	policies	may	cause	a	set	of	ASes	
to	exchange	route	information	messages	
indefinitely	and	not	to	converge	to	a	set	of					
stable	routes.
Routing	among	BGP	systems
Model	Checking
•	Model	checking	is	an	automated	technique	to	
formally	verify	the	correctness	of	a	finite-state			
system.
•	Safety	and	liveness	are	two	important								
specifications	for	communication	protocols.
•	Liveness	is	a	desired	property	that	should										
eventually	happen.
•	Input	to	model	checking	process	is	a	variant	of						
finite-state	systems	and	required	specifications	
are	expressed	in	terms	of	temporal	logic.
•	Linear	Time	Temporal	Logic	(LTL)	encodes					
information	about	the	future	of	paths.
•	Model	of	time	in	Computational	Tree	Logic	
(CTL)	is	a	tree-like	structure.
•	Probabilistic	Computational	Tree	Logic	(PCTL)			
introduces	probability	operator	to	CTL.
CTL	model	checking
LTL	model	checking
PCTL	model	checking
Prob (Xs) = [4/5  1/3  1  1/3  0]
Sat (P>.7[Xs])={S0,S2}
•	Viswanathan	et	al.,	describe	the													
global	BGP	execution	model	as	an	input-output							
automaton.
•	Assumption:	node	0	is	the	single	destination	for	
all	other	nodes.
•	Assumption:	Q(S)	is	the	set	of	states	of	the	
global	automaton	describing	path	assignments.
•	Let	⇡	be	a	mapping	function	that	assigns	each	
node	u	to	a	permitted	path	⇡(u).
•	For	every	node	u,	the	path	assignment	initially	
maps	the	empty	path			to	u (pi(u) = ).
•	Inputs	to	the	automaton	are	events	of	
the	form:	{advertiseu | u 2 U},	for	some	
U ✓ V − {0},	where	V 	is	the	set	of	all	nodes.
✏
•	The	transition	matrix	T(S)	of	such						
automaton	is	of	dimensions	|Q(S)|⇥ |Q(S)|  
and	T(S)ij =
�
U | ⇡i {advertiseu|u2U}! ⇡j
 
.
•	Let	p = (p1, ..., pn)	be	an	activation					
probability	vector	with	n = |V | 1,	where	
each	pi	represents	the	probability	that	
node	i	receives	an	event	advertisei.	Node		
i	recomputes	its	routes	after	receiving	the	
event.
•	T(S)	may	evolve	to	a	stochastic	transition	
matrix	T0(S)	by	casting	operator	P (·)	on	
every	element	of	T(S).	Let	 	be	a	subset	
of	power	set	of		V {0}.		P (·)	is	defined	
as:
P (γ) =
∑
U∈γ
p(U).
P (U) =
(∏
i∈U
pi
) ∏
j /∈U
(1− pj),
•	Any	instance	of	global	BGP	execution	is	safe	
with	respect	to	an	initial	state	⇡0	if	and	only	if	
for	an	activation	probability	vector	p		there	is	
no	cyclic	state.
•	PCTL:																																																		.
•	CTL*:																																																		.
⇡ does not occur
•	We	define	a	state	reward	function	⇢(⇡)	as:																																.
•	Let	 	denote	a	unique	absorbing	state.	The	number	of	transitions	made	until	 	is	reached	may	
be	expressed	as:	R=?[F δ].
ρ(pi) = 1, ∀pi ∈ Q(S)
⇡ occurs
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•	We	used	example	by	Viswanathan	et	al.,	and	PRISM	for	model	checking.
•	Network	configuration	is	deterministically	unsafe	but	probabilistically	safe.
•	The	calculated	convergence	time	is	infinity.
•	Case	p1=p2=1:	the	policy	is	not	safe.	Hence,	the	convergence	time	is	infinity.
•	Case	p1=p2=0.9:	the	policy	is	safe.	However,	the	absorbing	state	is	not	unique	and	the											
model	checking	total	calculated	reward	is	infinity.
Safety	illustration
Network	configuration
PRISM	model	checker	code
 								Transition	matrix 								Probabilistic	transition	matrix
dtmc
//global variables 
//initial properties
const double p1;
const double p2;
module mesh
//set of states
s :[0..8] init 0 ;
//trasntiosons
[] s=0 -> (1-p1)*(1-p2):(s'=0) + p1*(1-p2):(s' = 1) + (1-p1)*p2:(s'=3) + p1*p2:(s'= 4);
[] s=1 -> (1-p2):(s' = 1) + p2:(s'=7);
[] s=2 -> (1-p1)*(1-p2):(s'=2) + p1*(1-p2):(s' = 1) + (1-p1)*p2:(s'=5) + p1*p2:(s'= 4);
[] s=3 -> (1-p1):(s' = 3) + p2:(s'=5);
[] s=4 -> (1-p1)*(1-p2):(s'=4) + p1*(1-p2):(s' = 5) + (1-p1)*p2:(s'=7) + p1*p2:(s'= 8);
[] s=5 -> 1:(s'=5);
[] s=6 -> (1-p1)*(1-p2):(s'=6) + p1*(1-p2):(s' = 7) + (1-p1)*p2:(s'=3) + p1*p2:(s'= 4);
[] s=7 -> 1:(s'=7);
[] s=8 -> (1-p1)*(1-p2):(s'=8) + p1*(1-p2):(s' = 7) + (1-p1)*p2:(s'=5) + p1*p2:(s'= 4);
endmodule
rewards "convergence_time"
s=0 :1;
s=1 :1;
s=2 :1;
s=3 :0;
s=4 :1;
s=5 :1;
s=6 :1;
s=7 :1;
s=8 :0;
endrewards
P≥1
[
(GFs = 0) → (FGs = 0)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 1) → (FGs = 1)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 2) → (FGs = 2)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 3) → (FGs = 3)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 4) → (FGs = 4)] FALSE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 5) → (FGs = 5)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 6) → (FGs = 6)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 7) → (FGs = 7)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 8) → (FGs = 8)] FALSE
Safety	with	p1=p2=1 Safety	with	p1=p2=0.9
P≥1
[
(GFs = 0) → (FGs = 0)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 1) → (FGs = 1)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 2) → (FGs = 2)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 3) → (FGs = 3)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 4) → (FGs = 4)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 5) → (FGs = 5)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 6) → (FGs = 6)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 7) → (FGs = 7)] TRUE
P≥1
[
(GFs = 8) → (FGs = 8)] TRUE
P≥1
[
GFpi → FGpi], ∀pi ∈ Q(S)
A
[
GFpi → FGpi], ∀pi ∈ Q(S)
